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1. Abstract

This report covers two separate design studies on improving the safety and storage
configuration of spent nuclear fuel pools. The first study set out to find a chemical additive for
spent fuel pools that would raise the boiling point such that the risk of rapid boil off is reduced in
an extended loss-of-power accident scenario. This study is conducted in response to concerns
raised early in the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident that spent fuel pools could have boiled
away, causing damage to spent fuel assemblies. Sodium acetate was found to be a strong
candidate since it is not hazardous to plant personnel or the environment while exhibiting
acceptable corrosive characteristics on the timescale expected for SFP storage.
The second study has been conducted to determine the effectiveness and feasibility of
adding a neutron poison coating to spent nuclear fuel assemblies to reduce criticality concerns in
a scenario where compact storage configurations are desired. Brazing experiments found that a
45% Ag, 15% Cu, 16% Zn, and 24% Cd (by weight) alloy will successfully wet to zirconium.
Criticality safety performance of the alloy was evaluated with the SCALE 6.1 software package
which showed that the alloy could safely act as the sole neutron poison in a greatly condensed
storage configuration. Thermal impact of the coating is also considered and a rough calculation
is provided with a suggestion for future work. Neutron activation in the alloy is also analyzed
and it is noted that the transmutation of silver into cadmium may be significant due to the high
silver content.

4

2. Introduction

2.1 Background
Commercial nuclear power plants in the United States do not include reprocessing as a
part of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the possibility of Yucca Mountain as a long-term nuclear
waste repository no longer available, nuclear plants are forced to keep their waste on site. Spent
fuel pools and dry casks are the main forms of storage for the used fuel assemblies. The spent
fuel pools maintain sub-criticality, cooling, and shielding. Dry casks usually just provide cooling
capabilities and radiation shielding, as criticality is no longer a concern by the time assemblies
are put in the casks.
Used fuel removed from the core of a reactor is first placed in a spent fuel pool. Spent
fuel pools are large concrete basins lined with stainless steel. BWRs typically have elevated
spent fuel pools in secondary containment so that the top of the pool is located on the same level
as the refueling floor. PWRs use ground level spent fuel pools located in buildings outside of the
reactor building and must transfer the used fuel assemblies through a transfer tube. On average,
used fuel spends about five years in a spent fuel pool before being moved into dry cask storage.
In the United States, there is currently no off-site storage for used fuel. This is causing
many nuclear facilities to exceed their spent fuel capacity. Figure 1 contains data [1] from the
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), illustrating that this problem and how it will continue to get
worse in the near future.
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Figure 1: Nuclear facilities in the United States exceeding fuel pool capacity [1]

This diagram shows that over eighty of the reactor units in the United States have exceeded their
fuel pool capacity, and that by 2026, all operating units the US will have reached full capacity.
As facilities continue to add more fuel assemblies to their pools, they have had to add more
neutron absorbing materials. Many facilities began using Boraflex absorbers, a boron based
neutron poison in silicone rubber. However, the silicone was degraded by γ-irradiation, leading
to complications in spent fuel pools. The failure of this material costs these companies large
amounts of money to replace it with another material and clean the pools of degraded material.
Maintaining sub-criticality in pools with an ever-increasing amount of fuel assemblies remains a
key topic in the field of waste management following the natural disaster that eventually caused
6

a loss of all power to cooling systems at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan. This loss of
cooling caused the water in Unit 4 of the plant to start boiling off, but the used fuel assemblies
were never uncovered or reached dangerous temperatures. However, this occurrence created a
large push for emergency passive cooling systems since it was a matter of time before fuel rods
became uncovered and damaged, potentially releasing highly radioactive fission products to the
environment.

2.2 Project Goals
The first objective of the design project is to examine potential additives to spent fuel
pool water that would raise the boiling point of the water. This would allow more time before
the water would start to boil in an emergency situation. Unfortunately, the water composition of
spent fuel pools is strictly regulated. The spent fuel pool water is the same water from the
reactors cores themselves. This means that pure H2O is desired with a small concentration of
boron additive used in PWR designs. Any substance added to the water could not be corrosive to
the zircaloy fuel pins or any important primary coolant system components. However, we feel
that there may be a nitrate or acetate that will significantly raise the boiling point of the water
and not have a negative effect on the water composition.
The main goal of the project is to develop a neutron poison alloy that can coat individual
fuel rods in the assemblies in hopes of making it safe to use more compact spent fuel storage
configurations. Our plan is to braze an alloy with a known neutron poison to the fuel assemblies
in a dip coating process. A brazed alloy would provide a thin but effective absorber layer to help
maintain sub-criticality. This coating would also be a neutron absorber that would not degrade
significantly during irradiation.
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When looking for a potential alloy, we will be looking for alloys with a eutectic point
(melting temperature) at a temperature that does not exceed the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s (NRC) maximum temperatures for fuel pins, for both in the fuel pools and dry
casks [2]. The maximum clad temperature for fuel pins in a pool is around 570 ° C and around
400° C in a dry cask. Two potential alloys we have selected include a cadmium-copper alloy and
a cadmium-copper-silver-zinc alloy. Both of these alloys have eutectic melting points between
500 and 600 °C. Once one of our alloys has wetted the zircaloy fuel assemblies, we hope the
neutron absorption effect from the coating will allow for the removal of current neutron absorber
plates in the fuel pools. This will potentially allow for more space in the fuel pools for additional
assemblies.

This could also allow for more fuel assemblies to be packed into individual dry

cask containers. We will perform criticality simulations using the SCALE1 codes to confirm the
effect that they alloy will have on criticality safety. We will also need to perform heat transfer
calculations to confirm that the added layer of the alloy does not reduce heat transfer and pose a
meltdown risk.

1

Available from the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory
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3. Spent Fuel Pool Additive

3.1 Introduction and Motivation
The events following the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake included destruction of the means of
decay heat removal of the spent fuel pools (SFP) [3]. While the accident did not result in damage
to stored fuel assemblies, a similar accident could result in damage to fuel assemblies and
subsequent radiological release to the environment. The typical loading of the spent fuel pools of
operating light water reactors entails potentially catastrophic consequences in the event that loss
of cooling is not mitigated in the event of an accident. We propose the addition of a soluble
compound to the spent fuel pool of a nuclear reactor under accident conditions, in the event that
continued access to the SFP is endangered or lost. The addition of a soluble additive to the pool
water will raise the boiling point of the pool, permitting an extension of the typical grace period
and a reduction in the probability of fuel damage.
In the event of a sustained loss of SFP cooling, the SFP pool water enthalpy continually
rises, leading to boiling in the fuel racks and evaporative loss of the pool water inventory.
Eventually, enough volume is lost that two-phase water cooling of the fuel is removed. For
shrouded boiling water reactor fuel, the loss of cooling first occurs for the lower-burnup
assemblies. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon is due to the fact that the thermal power of
the lower (submerged) portion of the fuel assembly drives a two-phase cooling flow through the
top (uncovered) of the fuel assembly. Lower thermal power results in less swell and earlier
removal of two-phase cooling. Earlier removal of two-phase cooling results in earlier elevation
of the fuel cladding to dangerous temperatures. Conversely, partially submerged fuel assemblies
with higher thermal power generation will be able to sustain effective cooling for the top of the
9

assembly for longer as the SFP water levels lower in an accident. Once the cladding temperature
reaches a sufficiently high value, the zirconium will oxidize in a steam atmosphere at a rate
sufficient to cause ignition and sustainment of an exothermic reaction which will destroy the
cladding and result in relocation (such as violent expulsion, melting, or other forms of fuel
deformation and release) of contained fuel and fission products to the atmosphere. Relocation of
fuel may occur along with relocation of installed SFP neutron absorber elements, but it is
possible that relocation could result in criticality, either during pool boiling, or following reintroduction of coolant. For example, if fuel were to melt away from absorbers, it could form a
concentrated geometry and achieve critical conditions that may be exacerbated by neutron
moderation from water, leading to unexpected complications. Cladding failures, with or without
a subsequent criticality accident, would result in large releases of fission products to the
environment and significant consequences to the public.

3.2 Positive Effects of SFP Additive
The addition of a sodium acetate soluble additive to the pool water is proposed in order to
extend the grace period for all negative consequences following the failure of the spent fuel pool
cooling system. The mechanism by which the additive does this is the elevation of the boiling
point of the pool water due to the colligative effects of a solute in aqueous solution. Elevation of
the boiling point would have positive effects on both the SFP heat removal rate, and the heat
capacity of the pool. The heat removal rate of the SFP will improve over baseline once the bulk
temperature of the pool exceeds the typical boiling point of normal pool water, due to increased
heat transfer to the liner and surrounding concrete. The heat capacity is improved by raising the
upper temperature limit of the pool water.
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3.2a Grace-Period Extension
Due to the higher temperatures at the interfaces between the pool and liner, and the pool
and atmosphere, higher ambient heat removal is expected. The heat of dissolution of the
crystalline product (energy is absorbed during melting and can be released by recrystallization),
the increased heat transfer at higher endpoint temperatures, and the increased heat capacity will
all act to increase the grace period for all negative consequences of loss of pool water inventory.
A 10oC increase in boiling point would result in a 15% increased time to boiling for the initial
pool temperature of 35oC (as was the case at Fukushima). For the Fukushima plant with the
highest SFP thermal load, Unit 4, this would extend the time to boiling from 40 hours to 46
hours. This calculation assumes that the spent fuel pool has been sloshed due to seismic
acceleration down to 11m depth. If this grace period is pro-rated for consideration of the logistics
of long-range transport of technical accident response equipment (perhaps due to catastrophic
local conditions at a reactor), then the relative extension of the time that emergency response
personnel have to install and initiate additional equipment is even further extended. For example,
if the time until boiling in an extended loss-of-power accident is 40 hours for a typical SFP, and
the initial 20 hours are reserved for preparing emergency response equipment (leaving 20 hours
for hands-on emergency work), then an additive that extends time to boil-off by ~5 hours is
effectively extending the actual execution time available to emergency responders by 25% (25
hours versus the original 20 hours) despite appearing to only be a 12.5% increase in response
time (45 hours versus the original 40 hours). Extension of this rule to the prediction of
evaporation uncovering the top of active fuel and beyond requires detailed analysis, including
consideration of the character and properties of the solution as it is concentrated by evaporation,
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along with the expected surface condition of the upper region of the fuel assemblies as acetate
deposits accumulate on non-wetted surfaces.
3.2b Effects on Concrete Underlying Pools
Research by Al Otoom, et al., [4] indicates that external treatment of concrete with
aqueous sodium acetate solutions significantly reduces the permeability of the concrete to water.
Treatment of a 20 wt. % solution provides the optimal reduction in permeability. This effect
could mitigate the migration of fission products to groundwater in the event of a beyond-design
basis accident (DBA) which causes failure of the pool liner and small cracks in the concrete
supporting structure. This research also found improvement of the mechanical properties of
concrete within the range of concentrations expected to be useful for nuclear purposes.

3.3 Negative Effects of SFP Additive
Addition of large amounts of a solid crystalline additive complicates thermal-hydraulic
analysis of SFP behavior under accident conditions [4], and poses corrosion challenges during
the period of time that the pool contains a significant concentration of additive. While Sodium
Acetate is capable of storing significant energy after cooling from a supersaturated condition, we
expect that the turbulent conditions of a SFP being recovered from a significant heat up will
force crystallization during cooling and prevent the formation of a significant stored energy
source. The process of sodium acetate recrystallization is exothermic so a large amount of
previously absorbed energy could be unexpectedly released back into the pool water if a
supersaturated condition was achieved and then lost to an undesired recrystallization event. This
effect could be of substantial concern if an emergency response plan relied on the formation of a
heavily supersaturated sodium acetate solution. While the addition to the pool could be
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controlled so as to prevent saturation at the time of addition, excessive water loss could result in
a supersaturated condition if turbulence, as produced by boiling, was not sufficient to begin
crystallization. Additionally, a system which slowly and continuously added crystalline sodium
acetate to the pool would introduce sufficient seed crystals to prevent supersaturation during pool
cooldown.
3.3a Thermal-Hydraulic Concerns
Addition of large amounts of additive while the pool water is at low temperature could
result in occlusion of the rack inlet holes, preventing cyclic flow of cooling water through the
fuel assembly. This situation could be mitigated by either titrating addition, or delaying addition
until pool temperature is sufficiently high to permit rapid dissolution of additive inventory
beyond the maximum amount which will not occlude flow through the fuel assemblies. Addition
once the pool has reached maximum temperature would permit rapid addition of large amounts
of crystalline additive, due to the higher bulk temperatures and higher possible temperatures at
the bottom of the pool. The effect of hydrostatic head (pressure) on pool water boiling point, in
the case of the Fukushima-Daiichi pools, raises boiling point to 122oC at the bottom of a pool
which has been sloshed below 11m depth by seismic action. This effect could also be mitigated
by novel delivery of a mixture of preparations, such as a hybrid of a powdered component and
hollow cast dissolving nodes of additive, which could float or slowly sink to prevent excessive
buildup in the vicinity of the rack inlets.
For BWR fuel assemblies such as those at Fukushima, EPRI research [3] has showed that
loss of effective cooling, once pool level has dropped below the top of active fuel level, will first
occur for the lowest-power assemblies. This is due to less thermal power being available to drive
a two-phase mixture across the cladding of the top of the assemblies and subsequent temperature
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excursion. As the addition of large amounts of solute will both increase viscosity and reduce the
boiling rate at a given bulk pool temperature, the thermal-hydraulic effects of addition could
result in a net disadvantage once an accident progresses to this point. As the intent of the addition
is to extend the timeline for this consequence, we assess that the probability of such an event is
lower than that of current SFP configurations. Detailed thermal-hydraulic analysis is necessary to
determine the expectations for the progression of inventory loss and uncovering, as the geometry
and behavior of the pool is complex.
Spent fuel pool supporting systems would require engineering evaluations for suitability
in an aqueous environment that contains soluble additives many orders of magnitude higher than
the service for which they were designed. The obvious challenges presented by the additive
include hydraulic stresses imposed by the higher density of the pumped fluid, increased weight
stresses on supporting structures of piping, and the short-term impact of a more corrosive
environment.
3.3b Corrosion Concerns
The corrosive effects on the fuel assemblies and pool structures were considered using
aqueous Acetic Acid solutions as conservative surrogates for the pool environment [5]. Typical
fuel assembly materials, along with typical nuclear metallic materials were considered. The
effect on nonmetallic SFP structures (such Boraflex neutron absorbers) was not considered. It
should be considered that some materials which are suitable for handling concentrated Acetic
Acid are attacked by more dilute solutions. Characterization of the corrosion of SFP structures
and fuel assemblies under the exact conditions expected in an accident is necessary to develop
this technology.
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Zirconium and all zirconium-alloys surveyed exhibit acceptable corrosion rates under all
environments except for an aqueous environment of boiling acetic acid [5], combined with
saturation of gaseous HCl and Cl2. This environment does not resemble any expected accident
condition.
Nickel-based alloys have demonstrated acceptable resistance to corrosion by acetic acid
solutions in the absence of oxidizing ions. In the presence of an air sparge, or addition of high
concentrations of cupric ions, Nickel 400 has exhibited corrosion rates which would be
unacceptable for long-term maintenance of the acetate solution. Additionally, some Inconels
have demonstrated unacceptable corrosion rates when in dilute acetic acid solutions containing
additional contaminants. This may not occur in a basic or neutral environment, and it may also
not occur in strong acetate solutions. It is possible that all of the nickel-based alloys in use would
be suitable for service under accident conditions, but characterization of acetate-driven corrosion
of nickel-based alloys specifically requires attention.
400 Series stainless steels are unsuitable for handling of acetic acid solutions. Testing is
necessary to determine the susceptibility to acetate corrosion under accident conditions. Type
304 stainless steel is widely used in the storage of concentrated acetic acid, and is also used for
the storage and shipment of dilute solutions. Type 316 stainless steel is ubiquitous in the
processing of acetic acid and therefore highly unlikely to be unsuitable under any foreseeable
pool condition. In the event that the pool is entirely evaporated, a new corrosion mode is
presented, but that condition is expected to occur after or concurrent with destruction of fuel
cladding by Zirconium-Hydride reaction. Any stainless-steel pool structures remaining are
unlikely to serve any safety function at this point.
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Carbon and low-alloy steels are unsuitable for acetic acid service. Implementation of an
additive system for accident mitigation would likely necessitate replacement of any such
materials in the pool. Due to the poor general corrosion characteristics of these steels, their
presence is not expected in the wetted volume of the pool.
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4. Neutron Absorber Alloy

4.1 Introduction and Motivation
In light of dwindling SFP storage space at nuclear power plants across the United States,
the question is raised whether or not more compact storage configurations can be developed that
significantly improve space allocation in a conventional SFP. Current SFP designs use neutron
poisons in the form of absorber plates to maintain subcritical conditions, and these designs need
a certain distance between adjacent fuel bundles such that the absorber plates can fit and be
effective. If it is possible to develop an alternative neutron poison in the form of a thin absorber
on the surface of individual fuel rods, this may allow for fuel rods and assemblies to be placed
closer together while maintaining subcriticality.
There is a concern that such a poison coating could become scraped off in a handling
accident or by wear-and-tear of normal operation, so it is desirable to find an alloy that will
solder/braze effectively to zircaloy and form a strong bond. The coating should be thick enough
to perform effectively as the sole absorber in a SFP but not so thick that it poses a challenge to
decay heat removal. These concerns as well as neutron activation behavior are used as evaluation
criteria in the search to identify a suitable alloy for use in a condensed SFP.

4.2 Alloy Melting Experiments
4.2a Experimental Equipment
The major equipment used for our brazing experiments consisted of a chemical fume
hood, a compact enclosed furnace (Thermolyne 120V muffle furnace) fitted with a digital
temperature regulator (EUROTHERM 2116), and an open casting pot (Lee 110V melter
17

furnace). Pictures of these three major pieces of experimental equipment are collected in Figure
2 below. Note that a brand-new open casting pot was used for this project to reduce the chance of
encountering unwanted contaminant materials during melting procedures.

Figure 2: Chemical hood, furnace, and melting pot used in our experiments (L to R)

4.2b Experiment 1: Cu-Cd
The first melting experiment was set up to wet a Cu-Cd alloy to zircaloy-4 samples. This
binary alloy system has a eutectic point at 39 wt.% Cd with a melting temperature of 544 °C.
Therefore, a small sample of a 0.5-inch diameter cadmium rod and a strip of copper wire were
collected in a ceramic crucible at this particular mass ratio using electronic scales present in our
laboratory. The crucible was placed in a small enclosed furnace and the temperature was set to
400 °C to first melt the cadmium. Ideally, the cadmium should have melted around 321 °C,
forming a pool around the copper so that the copper would dissolve to form our alloy despite
pure copper having a melting point that approaches 1100 °C. However, repeated observations of
the sample indicated that the copper wire was not dissolving, so we raised the temperature on our
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furnace in hopes of speeding up the dissolution. This process of increasing furnace temperature
was repeated until we reached the boiling point of cadmium, at which point we abandoned the
experiment. The contents of the crucible were given ample time to cool before inspecting the
failed alloy and it was found that excessive oxidation on the copper wire had prevented it from
dissolving. Figure 3 shows the heavily oxidized crucible contents that failed to dissolve (note the
coating of Cd crystals on the crucible).

Figure 3: Ceramic crucible containing oxidized cadmium and copper

4.2c Experiment 2: Ag45 Alloy
A second melting experiment was arranged, this time using a premade brazing alloy to
simplify the process. This second alloy is comprised of 45% Ag, 15% Cu, 16% Zn, and 24% Cd
by weight fraction. According to the manufacturer specifications [6], the alloy should be fully
melted at 618 °C. We began by melting a small sample of the alloy in a heated casting pot
(typically used for lead) until it formed a shallow pool. Several sticks of zircaloy-4 tubing were
quickly dipped into the alloy pool and smeared around in hopes of achieving wetting before the
zircaloy oxidized. Due to difficulties in performing the dip before significant oxidation occurred,
19

we attempted two more methods while we had enough silver alloy remaining. The second
approach entailed tipping the casting pot up to make the small alloy pool deeper and more
concentrated, and a propane torch was introduced to speed up the alloy heating. Multiple zircaloy
tubes were dipped into the resulting alloy pool and collected for further inspection. The final
method was a more conventional brazing approach for this alloy. On the final attempts of
achieving a wet, a brazing flux was applied to the tips of zircaloy tubes while the alloy was
heated with a propane torch above the zircaloy. The braze alloy was dripped and smeared on the
zircaloy tube while the tube was rotated so that all of the flux was used. All four zircaloy
samples are shown in Figure 4. Starting on the left, the first two tubes were dipped when only
the melting pot was present. The third tube was dipped into alloy that was heated by the pot and
propane torch combined, and the fourth tube represents the attempt to use a brazing flux with
heat from the torch.

Figure 4: Zircaloy tubing samples after Ag45 dip application

Upon visual inspection of the zircaloy tubes from the silver alloy experiment, the best
sample was determined to have come from the second method. Further inspection under a
20

microscope indicated that wetting occurred successfully with the melting pot/butane torch
combination. The diameter of the best sample was measured to be 9.86-mm after dipping
(compared to 9.3-mm original diameter), and the second best sample had a diameter of 9.58-mm.
Due to the alloy’s tendency to “clot” from uneven heating and oxidation, it is very likely that
these diameters are overestimated. For practical purposes, the results indicate that a coating of at
least 50-μm is possible. However, both experiments suffered greatly from the effects of
oxidation, so further research with these alloys may require the use of an inert atmosphere
melting configuration. This may be particularly true if large scale operations are pursued. It is
possible that using deeper pools of brazing alloy could mitigate the effects of oxidation as well
since the shallow pools were so susceptible to the aforementioned “clotting” problem.

4.3 Criticality Safety Analysis
Several criticality safety evaluations were conducted on the Ag45 brazing alloy within
the context of spent fuel pool storage. The SCALE 6.1 software package was used to complete
the evaluations with simplified fuel bundle arrangements. Westinghouse 17x17 PWR-type fuel
assemblies were used as a template to construct fuel rod and bundle geometries [7], and some
key assumptions were made in order to run the software. First, it is assumed that 50-μm of Ag45
alloy is applied uniformly to the clad surface on every single fuel rod in all codes using the
absorber alloy. Second, all UO2 fuel is assumed have an enrichment of 5% U-235 for every
single fuel rod. Third, it is assumed that aluminum is an acceptable replacement for zinc for the
purpose of evaluating criticality safety. This substitution was made because SCALE 6.1 cross
sections libraries do not contain sufficient data for zinc to run an evaluation. Aluminum was
chosen specifically because it is rather transparent to neutrons, making it a conservative option.
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For comparison, the micro and macroscopic thermal neutron absorption cross sections of zinc are
σa = 1.10 b and Σa = 0.072 cm-1 and for aluminum they are σa = 0.241 b and Σa = 0.015 cm-1 [8].
4.3a Standard Spent Fuel Model
The first pool configuration was an attempt to approximate actual spent fuel pools used in
industry based on publicly available photographs. 400 PWR-type fuel bundles were arranged in a
20x20 matrix, and they are submerged about 5 meters below the surface of an 11-meter deep
pool of pure water. 1 meter of concrete surrounds the bottom and sides of the pool acting as a
neutron reflector. Adjacent bundles are spaced 6-cm apart, but no structural dividers or absorber
plates are included in the code. Figure 5 below depicts a vertical and horizontal cutaway of one
pool corner. Without the Ag45 alloy coating, the spaced configuration would be supercritical
(keff = 1.29), but with a 50-μm alloy coating present the same layout is subcritical by a wide
margin (keff = 0.55).

Figure 5: Corner of SFP with 6-mm spacing between bundles
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This configuration was also simulated with other alloy thickness to determine a relationship
between coating thickness and keff, and the results of the other simulations are displayed in
Figure 6 below. The red dotted line corresponds to keff = 0.95 which is frequently used as the
maximum allowable keff in criticality safety evaluations. This plot indicates that a coating thinner
than 50-μm could be used to maintain an acceptable margin of subcriticality in our standard SFP
configuration, but it is unknown if an industrial-scale dipping process could reliably apply such a
thin coating. We suspect it will be difficult to control the alloy application to within such a thin
coating based on our own Ag-45 experiment. Therefore, the remaining SFP models will still use
the assumption that the coating is 50-μm thick.
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Figure 6: keff versus Ag-45 coating thickness for a standard SFP

4.3b Spent Fuel Pool with Close-Packed Bundles
The second configuration closely matches the first with one major change: the 6-cm
spacing between bundles has been removed. The pool contents were effectively converted to one
23

giant 340x340 fuel bundle with this modification. This setup was used to test the effectiveness of
the Ag45 alloy in the context of severe space limitations for a spent fuel pool. Without any
absorber present, the pool was found to be very supercritical (keff = 1.59). Adding in the uniform
alloy coating brought the pool down to subcritical levels (keff = 0.69), indicating that the alloy
can be highly effective in a scenario where fuel bundle arrangements are condensed to the point
of touching one another. Figure 7 below depicts the tightly packed fuel rods in this setup.

Figure 7: Corner of SFP with minimal bundle spacing

4.3c Spent Fuel Pool with Rod Spacing Removed
The final pool configuration is the most ambitious, and it is intended to model a scenario
where fuel rods have been removed from the 17x17 arrays and packed directly together. The rods
are still submerged in pure water, and they are assumed to remain in a square lattice arrangement
as opposed to a hexagonal lattice. The same pool and concrete format is used, except the pool in
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this case is narrower due to the close packing. Figure 8 shows a close up cutaway view of the
assumed lattice, with and without the absorber alloy. The arrangement is supercritical without an
absorber (keff = 1.28) and subcritical with the alloy (keff = 0.79), indicating that coated fuel rods
could be placed extremely close together in a spent fuel pool if thermal characteristics allow it.

Figure 8: Close-up comparison of tight-packed array with and without Ag45 alloy

4.4 Thermal Analysis
When selecting a suitable neutron poison coating it is important to also consider the
thermal impact that the coating will have on the spent nuclear fuel. Heat transfer is already
problematic without a coating resulting in the requirement for spent nuclear fuel to spend several
years in wet storage before moving to dry storage. In order to thoroughly analyze the impact of a
coating on a spent fuel element a computational method should be implied. The impact on the
overall thermal performance of the cask could also be determined. However, a thermal code is
not available to the research group at this time so an analytical approach is taken. There are
several assumptions and generalizations that are made.
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Temperature gradients in the fuel combined with loads determine potential for material
failure. The fuel temperature is dependent on a number of factors. In this analysis we do not
consider the actual heat transfer. We consider only the thermal resistive network and the
resistance of the neutron poison compared to the other materials in the fuel. An initial analysis
was performed to determine the contribution of the coating material to the thermal resistance
network.
The method for this analysis is outlined in Todreas, Schmidt, and Duderstadt. First,
consider the thermal properties of the fuel itself, UO2. The analysis determines the thermal
conductivity of UO2 at 95% theoretical density. This analysis considers the thermal conductivity
estimate formulated by Westinghouse [7].

It should be noted that there is a polynomial expansion of the thermal conductivity that is used
by Babcock and Wilcox as well as an expansion from Combustion Engineering. The thermal
properties are determined by temperature, porosity, oxygen to metal atomic ratio, Plutonium
content, pellet cracking, and burnup. There are procedures to determine the contribution of each
of these effects to the overall heat transfer. The individual effects are not considered as this
analysis is concerned with the macroscopic heat transfer.
It is important to note that there are changes that occur in the fuel as it is burned. Due to
high temperatures and irradiation the structure of the fuel may change. If there is a region in the
fuel which exceeds a certain threshold, sintering, a loss of porosity may occur. This leads to
regions where there is a void at the center with a ring of dense fuel. These changes typically
occur within the first few days of operation. Figure 9 contains a fuel pin cross section showing
the combined effects of thermal stress and neutron irradiation on uranium oxide [9].
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Figure 9: Cross section of a fuel pellet after exposure to irradiation and thermal stresses

As a result, it is often necessary to consider temperature distributions across three zones.
Due to changes in the material that occur during irradiation is often not appropriate to assume
that the fuel has uniform properties. The material changes that are accounted for in a multi zone
thermal analysis will reduce the thermal resistance between the centerline and outside pellet.
Multi zone heat transfer also accounts for porosity, oxygen to metal atomic ratio, plutonium
content, pellet cracking and burnup. However, for the purpose of this analysis, this effect is not
considered, and a single zone thermal analysis is conducted.
The next area that is considered is the gap between the fuel pellet and the cladding. This
is a space that is usually filled with an inert gas such as helium. The fill gas changes with burnup
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due to the release of gaseous fission products. Variations in the gap width arise due to pellet
cracking. Thermal expansion of the fuel further reduces this gap. The gap reduction and contact
between the pellet and clad reduces thermal resistance. The variation in gap distance is not
considered and a mean gap distance is chosen. This value is provided by Todreas [7], and a
diagram of these values is included in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10: Effect on pellet-to-cladding gap distance on thermal conductivity

The contribution of the coating must also be calculated. Typically, the heat transfer
coefficient of many materials is determined experimentally. An estimate of the heat transfer of
our alloy was calculated using weighted averages of the component materials. It should be noted
that the component of the alloy with the lowest thermal conductivity is still much greater than
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that of UO2. The neutron poison coating was estimated at a thickness of 1mm. The final thermal
resistance network is:

̅̅̅
The resistance of the coating is orders of magnitude lower than that of UO2. It can be concluded
that the coating will not appreciably hinder the thermal conductivity of the spent fuel. A plot has
been included below in Figure 11 to illustrate the clad temperature vs applied thickness in a
range from 0.5-mm to 1.0-cm. The code to generate this plot is attached in the appendix. The
code assumed a centerline temperature of 1400 °C and a bulk coolant temperature of 324 °C. The
graph further shows how little impact the thermal resistance of the coating has. However, future
work using computational codes is needed to verify this result. Additional calculations are
provided in the appendix.

Figure 11: Projected outer fuel-clad temperature as a function of alloy coating thickness
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4.5 Neutron Activation Analysis
As part of the consideration for using Silveraloy 45 as the dipping alloy to coat the spent
fuel rods, it is necessary to analyze how each component of the alloy will respond to the neutron
flux from the spent fuel. Because the manufacturer does not specify the isotopic make-up of each
element in the alloy [6], natural abundances have been assumed.
The primary component of the alloy by weight percent is silver at 45%. Natural silver is
51.84% Ag-107 and 48.16% Ag-109. Ag-107 has a thermal neutron absorption cross section of
37 barns and Ag-109 has a cross section of 91 barns. Upon absorption of a neutron, both silver
nuclei will decay through beta-minus decay into stable isotopes of cadmium.
The copper weight percent component of Silveraloy 45 is 15%. Similarly to silver,
natural copper is composed of two isotopes; 69.15% Cu-63 and 30.85% Cu-65. The thermal
neutron absorption cross-section of both isotopes is only a few barns each, however, 4 and 2
barns respectively. With half-lives of only minutes and hours, the copper isotopes decay to stable
isotopes of zirconium.
Perhaps the most important component of the alloy is cadmium which is 24% by weight.
The neutron absorption characteristics of cadmium were the reason Silveraloy 45 was chosen as
a dip initially, with cadmium having a thermal neutron cross section around 2450 barns. The
absorption of neutrons by cadmium is the desired effect of the alloy and therefore neutron
activation of cadmium is not further considered. The final component zinc, composing 16% of
the alloy by weight, does not have any appreciable neutron absorption characteristics.
The two smallest components of the alloy can be generally ignored as zinc does not
absorb thermal neutrons and the copper atom ratio is very small in comparison to the very large
amounts of cadmium and silver. The large silver component however is significant. Although the
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cross-section for silver is quite small compared to the large absorption cross-section of the
cadmium, it may seem that the material composition could potentially change due to the
transmutation of the large amount of silver. It is currently unknown but this may have negative
effects on the performance of the alloy coating. However, due to the relatively low neutron flux
in the SFP, about 108 neutrons/cm2/sec, the transmutation of silver is not a concern [10]. Even so,
if the silver did transmutate, the large cross sections of the resulting cadmium isotopes could
prolong the effectiveness of the alloy as a neutron absorber.
A rough burnup calculation for the alloy can be made to estimate the time until half of the
effective absorber material (namely cadmium) is depleted. For the sake of simplicity, several
assumptions are made. First, the neutron flux in the SFP is assumed to be 108 neutrons/cm2/sec
[10]. Second, all neutrons are assumed to be thermalized by the pool water. Also, cadmium is
assumed to be the only active neutron absorber based on the size of its thermal neutron cross
section relative to the other elements. Finally, the effects of silver transmutation into cadmium
are ignored. An equation for the expected reaction rate is given by the equation:

where NCd is used to represent the remaining amount of cadmium absorber. A general solution
for the differential equation is:

where K is a boundary condition. The half-life for this general solution can easily be determined
without the need for a given boundary condition using the expression
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A half-life of 90,000 years indicates that absorber burnup will be insignificant for the duration of
SFP storage at the assumed flux levels. In the unlikely event that the coated rods were
reintroduced to a high flux environment (such as in a criticality accident) this time could be
greatly reduced. However, it is inferred from our criticality safety analysis that a SFP using our
absorber will remain subcritical by a wide margin.
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5. Conclusions

5.1 Spent Fuel Pool Additive
The addition of a soluble additive to the SFP of a damaged reactor facility can potentially
extend the grace period of important events and consequently reduce the probability of serious
releases of the fission products contained in stored fuel assemblies. The additive considered,
sodium acetate, appears to present a low corrosion hazard to the fuel assemblies, pool structures,
and pool liner. Additionally, exposure of concrete to the SFP water would reduce concrete
permeability. Sodium acetate does not present a toxic hazard to plant personnel or the
environment. The corrosion rates exhibited by test specimens in the literature are acceptable over
the short timespan that the additive is expected to be present in the pool. The increased viscosity
and boiling point of the pool water could serve to lower the probability of a severe pool accident,
but detailed thermal-hydraulic analyses are necessary to verify that addition will not excessively
exacerbate the progress of an accident once the pool inventory has dropped below the top of
active fuel, as vigorous boiling and two-phase flow serves to cool fuel elements. Corrosion
testing of the exact materials used in pools, across the range of normal and accident conditions,
will also be necessary to safely implement this technology.

5.2 Neutron Absorber Alloy
Applying a neutron absorbing alloy to the clad surface of spent nuclear fuel rods can be
very effective in preventing a criticality excursion within a SFP environment. Multiple SCALE
models were created to test the safety performance of a commercially available Ag45 Silveralloy
(containing 24% cadmium by weight) and the alloy provided yielded high margins of safety in
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each case. Every storage configuration was tested twice, once without any neutron absorbers and
once with a 50-μm coating of the alloy on all fuel rods, and the alloy consistently proved to be
capable of maintaining sub-criticality with no assistance from absorber plates typically used in
SFPs. In the model representative of a standard SFP, keff was brought down from 1.29 to 0.55 by
the alloy. In a similar SFP with fuel bundles placed very close together, the alloy took keff from
1.59 down to 0.69. A final model was prepared to represent a scenario where individual fuel rods
were removed from the fuel bundles and placed directly against one another in a square pitch
geometry, and the alloy reduced keff from 1.28 to 0.79. Results from the latter two scenarios
demonstrate that the alloy could be useful for storage situations designed to maximize fuel
storage in a limited space.
A thermal analysis for the Ag45 alloy coating indicates that the alloy coating would
contribute a minor amount to thermal resistivity to the fuel rods when compared to the resistivity
from the UO2 fuel pellets. A simulation was conducted to determine the relationship between
alloy coating thickness and outside clad temperature, and the simulation indicates that outside
clad temperature would increase minimally even for very thick coatings on the order of several
millimeters. Since the criticality safety analysis showed that coatings much thinner than 1-mm
are sufficient for maintaining sub-criticality, it is unlikely that such thick coatings would be used
in practice where cost-saving measures are crucial. A more in-depth analysis with specialized
software is necessary to confirm these results before this design can truly be considered viable.
Neutron activation analysis on the Ag45 alloy does not suggest that any particularly
troublesome isotopes would be produced in a SFP environment. However, the analysis did
suggest that activated silver in the alloy may undergo beta decay transmutation into more
cadmium. Considering that cadmium is the desired absorber element, and that silver comprises
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the largest fraction of the alloy by weight, this suggests that the effective lifespan of the alloy
would be longer than anticipated if only the original cadmium was used in burnup estimations.
This is generally not a great concern for basic fuel storage where the neutron flux is significantly
lower than a reactor setting. A simple burnup estimation using for typical SFP flux conditions
indicated that the cadmium burnup will be negligible for the duration of pool storage.
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6. Future Work

The extent of practical applications and methods discovered in only one semester spent
on this major design project is obviously limited. A vast amount of research and design must
still be done before our ideas could be put into real world practice. In multi-billion dollar
facilities, every new change to the system must be perfectly designed and regulated.

6.1 Additive Concerns
While the spent fuel pool additive may allow for a needed extended grace period during
an emergency, it may also have some negative effects that require further testing. When added
while the SFP is at a cooler temperature, the additive could potentially hinder cooling water flow
through fuel assemblies. Tests must be done to determine whether the additive can be added
while the SFP is at normal temperatures or after the temperature has increased to a level where
the additive can completely dissolve in the water upon addition. Additional thermal-hydraulic
analysis is required to determine expectations for how the water would react once the water
began to boil and potentially uncover the fuel. Any plant that actually implemented our sodium
acetate additive would have to remove all stainless steel and alloy steel materials in the fuel pool
to prevent corrosion.
The raw material cost for sodium acetate varies depending on quality and quantity, with
smaller 500g laboratory-oriented samples costing $20 to $30 per kilogram [11]. However,
significantly lower unit prices are possible if purchased in bulk. The exact price per pool would
depend on pool size and additive concentration. Future work is recommended to determine the
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concentration and price to treat a SFP with this additive, including whether or not new filtration,
ion exchange, or cooling systems must be developed to handle the additive.

6.2 Thermal Analysis
It is recommended that a full thermal-hydraulic code is used to analyze the impact of the
neutron absorber alloy on thermal resistance of the system. The analysis used did not consider
cracks or changes in porosity, both of which are common occurrences. Additionally, the total
impact of the coating is not known. While contribution to the thermal resistance for one rod is
known, it is unknown what effect this will have on the heat transfer of the cask. The system is
too complex to simply extrapolate the additional resistance to heat transfer by multiplying the
resistance times the number of rods. It is possible that a more in-depth analysis would show that
this coating would not be feasible given the current limitations of heat transfer inside a dry cask.
The code should also be leveraged to determine the effect on the bulk temperature of the water in
the spent fuel pool. It is possible that this resistance, although low, would have significant impact
on the spent fuel pool.

6.3 Economic Viability and Retrofit Potential
The absorber alloy analysis does not consider the cost either in time or money for such an
operation. Economically, several problems arise immediately. The first is the sheer cost of the
alloy itself. An alloy that is 45% silver by weight is expensive. The process of coating the fuel
will also prove costly. It is likely that an inert atmosphere will have to be used to prevent the
oxidation of zircaloy at the temperatures at which the alloy is applied. It is possible that the rods
may be removed from the assemblies and coated individually leading to a smaller processing
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area, but this may be more costly than dipping the entire assembly. A rough estimate for solely
the material cost of a 50-μm Ag-45 coating per rod would be 58 grams (6.4 cm3 of alloy) at
$1.53/gram ($43.33/ounce [10]), or around $89 a rod. This translates to around $25,700 per
17x17 fuel assembly for just the Ag-45 alloy alone. Further work is recommended to determine
the total cost of dipping complete with transportation, handling, and other associated prices.
The equipment to perform these operations does not exist on site. Transporting the spent
fuel off site is not very likely unless it is headed for a repository. Therefore, the work must be
done on site in a newly fabricated facility. Since our group had a very limited supply of the alloy
to use in experimental dip coatings, the dipping process is still relatively unknown and
inconsistent. A consistent dipping process must be determined to ensure quality coatings on all
fuel assemblies dipped in the new process. Even though the Ag-Cd-Cu-Zn alloy was able to wet
a zirconium rod in our laboratory, extensive tests and trial runs must be performed to determine
the feasibility of actually implementing this dip process. Also, it is imperative to find a way to
safely shield the working environment from the radiation given off by fuel assemblies removed
from the pool to be coated. One potential idea is a large concrete tube to pull the used fuel
assembly into as it is being removed from the SFP. Further work is recommended to determine
the industrial process to properly handle and coat these assemblies.
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Appendix A: SCALE 6.1 Models

Spent fuel pool with no additional absorber:
=csas25 parm=(nitawl)
Spent Fuel Pool without Absorber Alloy
44groupndf5
read composition
uo2
1 DEN=9.21 1.00
300 92235 5 92238 95 end
zirc4
2
1.00
300
end
h2o
3
1.00
300
end
reg-concrete 5
1.00
300
end
end composition
read param
gen=203 npg=1000 nsk=3
end param
read geometry
unit 1
cylinder 1 1 0.4095 426.7 0
cylinder 2 1 0.4750 426.7 0
cuboid
3 1 0.63 -0.63 0.63 -0.63 1000 -100
unit 2
array 1 -10.71 -10.71 -100
cuboid 3 1 4p13.71 1000 -100
global unit 3
array 2 -274.2 -274.2 -100
cuboid 5 1 4p374.2 1000 -200
end geometry
read array
ara=1 nux=17 nuy=17 nuz=1 fill f1 end fill
ara=2 nux=20 nuy=20 nuz=1 fill f2 end fill
end array
read plot
scr=yes
ttl='xz cutaway'
pic=mixtures
xul=0
yul=3.63
zul=1000
xlr=374.2
ylr=3.63
zlr=-200
nax=200
ndn=640
uax=1 vax=0 wax=0
udn=0 vdn=0 wdn=-1
end
scr=yes
ttl='xy cutaway'
pic=mixtures
xul=0
yul=374.2
zul=0
xlr=374.2
ylr=0
zlr=0
nax=640
ndn=640
uax=1 vax=0 wax=0
udn=0 vdn=-1 wdn=0
end
end plot
end data
end
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Spent fuel pool with all rods coated in Ag45 absorber alloy:
=csas25 parm=(nitawl)
Spent Fuel Pool with Absorber Alloy
44groupndf5
read composition
uo2
1 DEN=9.21 1.00
300 92235 5 92238 95 end
zirc4
2
1.00
300
end
h2o
3
1.00
300
end
ag
4
0.39071
end
cu
4
0.15248
end
al
4
0.20410
end
cd
4
0.25271
end
reg-concrete 5
1.00
300
end
end composition
read param
gen=203 npg=1000 nsk=3
end param
read geometry
unit 1
cylinder 1 1 0.4095 426.7 0
cylinder 2 1 0.4750 426.7 0
cylinder 4 1 0.4800 426.7 0
cuboid
3 1 0.63 -0.63 0.63 -0.63 1000 -100
unit 2
array 1 -10.71 -10.71 -100
cuboid 3 1 4p13.71 1000 -100
global unit 3
array 2 -274.2 -274.2 -100
cuboid 5 1 4p374.2 1000 -200
end geometry
read array
ara=1 nux=17 nuy=17 nuz=1 fill f1 end fill
ara=2 nux=20 nuy=20 nuz=1 fill f2 end fill
end array
end data
end
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Condensed spent fuel pool with no absorber alloy:
=csas25 parm=(nitawl)
Spent Fuel Pool without Absorber Alloy **CONDENSED**
44groupndf5
read composition
uo2
1 DEN=9.21 1.00
300 92235 5 92238 95
zirc4
2
1.00
300
h2o
3
1.00
300
reg-concrete 5
1.00
300
end composition
read param
gen=203 npg=1000 nsk=3
end param
read geometry
unit 1
cylinder 1 1 0.4095 426.7 0
cylinder 2 1 0.4750 426.7 0
cuboid
3 1 0.63 -0.63 0.63 -0.63 1000 -100
unit 2
array 1 -10.71 -10.71 -100
cuboid 3 1 4p10.71 1000 -100
global unit 3
array 2 -214.2 -214.2 -100
cuboid 5 1 4p314.2 1000 -200
end geometry
read array
ara=1 nux=17 nuy=17 nuz=1 fill f1 end fill
ara=2 nux=20 nuy=20 nuz=1 fill f2 end fill
end array
read plot
scr=yes
ttl='xz cutaway'
pic=mixtures
xul=0
yul=0.63
zul=1000
xlr=314.2
ylr=0.63
zlr=-200
nax=170
ndn=640
uax=1 vax=0 wax=0
udn=0 vdn=0 wdn=-1
end
scr=yes
ttl='xy cutaway'
pic=mixtures
xul=0
yul=314.2
zul=0
xlr=314.2
ylr=0
zlr=0
nax=640
ndn=640
uax=1 vax=0 wax=0
udn=0 vdn=-1 wdn=0
end
end plot
end data
end
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end
end
end
end

Condensed spent fuel pool with Ag45 alloy present on all rods:
=csas25 parm=(nitawl)
Spent Fuel Pool with Absorber Alloy **CONDENSED**
44groupndf5
read composition
uo2
1 DEN=9.21 1.00
300 92235 5 92238 95 end
zirc4
2
1.00
300
end
h2o
3
1.00
300
end
ag
4
0.39071
end
cu
4
0.15248
end
al
4
0.20410
end
cd
4
0.25271
end
reg-concrete 5
1.00
300
end
end composition
read param
gen=203 npg=1000 nsk=3
end param
read geometry
unit 1
cylinder 1 1 0.4095 426.7 0
cylinder 2 1 0.4750 426.7 0
cylinder 4 1 0.4800 426.7 0
cuboid
3 1 0.63 -0.63 0.63 -0.63 1000 -100
unit 2
array 1 -10.71 -10.71 -100
cuboid 3 1 4p10.71 1000 -100
global unit 3
array 2 -214.2 -214.2 -100
cuboid 5 1 4p314.2 1000 -200
end geometry
read array
ara=1 nux=17 nuy=17 nuz=1 fill f1 end fill
ara=2 nux=20 nuy=20 nuz=1 fill f2 end fill
end array
end data
end
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Spent fuel pool with rods removed from 17x17 arrays and pressed together in a square pitch;
absorber not used:
=csas25 parm=(nitawl)
Spent Fuel Pool with Absorber Alloy
44groupndf5
read composition
uo2
1 DEN=9.21 1.00
300 92235 5 92238 95 end
zirc4
2
1.00
300
end
h2o
3
1.00
300
end
ag
4
0.39071
end
cu
4
0.15248
end
al
4
0.20410
end
cd
4
0.25271
end
reg-concrete 5
1.00
300
end
end composition
read param
gen=203 npg=1000 nsk=3
end param
read geometry
unit 1
cylinder 1 1 0.4095 426.7 0
cylinder 2 1 0.4750 426.7 0
cuboid
3 1 0.475 -0.475 0.475 -0.475 1000 -100
unit 2
array 1 -8.075 -8.075 -100
cuboid 3 1 4p8.075 1000 -100
global unit 3
array 2 -161.5 -161.5 -100
cuboid 5 1 4p261.5 1000 -200
end geometry
read array
ara=1 nux=17 nuy=17 nuz=1 fill f1 end fill
ara=2 nux=20 nuy=20 nuz=1 fill f2 end fill
end array
read plot
scr=yes
ttl='xy cutaway'
pic=mixtures
xul=160
yul=162
zul=0
xlr=162
ylr=160
zlr=0
nax=400
ndn=400
uax=1 vax=0 wax=0
udn=0 vdn=-1 wdn=0
end
end plot
end data
end
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Spent fuel pool with rods removed from 17x17 arrays and pressed together in a square pitch;
Ag45 absorber alloy present on all rods:
=csas25 parm=(nitawl)
Spent Fuel Pool with Absorber Alloy
44groupndf5
read composition
uo2
1 DEN=9.21 1.00
300 92235 5 92238 95 end
zirc4
2
1.00
300
end
h2o
3
1.00
300
end
ag
4
0.39071
end
cu
4
0.15248
end
al
4
0.20410
end
cd
4
0.25271
end
reg-concrete 5
1.00
300
end
end composition
read param
gen=203 npg=1000 nsk=3
end param
read geometry
unit 1
cylinder 1 1 0.4095 426.7 0
cylinder 2 1 0.4750 426.7 0
cylinder 4 1 0.4800 426.7 0
cuboid
3 1 0.48 -0.48 0.48 -0.48 1000 -100
unit 2
array 1 -8.16 -8.16 -100
cuboid 3 1 4p8.16 1000 -100
global unit 3
array 2 -163.2 -163.2 -100
cuboid 5 1 4p263.2 1000 -200
end geometry
read array
ara=1 nux=17 nuy=17 nuz=1 fill f1 end fill
ara=2 nux=20 nuy=20 nuz=1 fill f2 end fill
end array
read plot
scr=yes
ttl='xy cutaway'
pic=mixtures
xul=161.75
yul=163.75
zul=0
xlr=163.75
ylr=161.75
zlr=0
nax=400
ndn=400
uax=1 vax=0 wax=0
udn=0 vdn=-1 wdn=0
end
end plot
end data
end
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Appendix B: MATLAB Thermal Modeling Code

_t=.5*10^-3;
n=1;
while n<97
%Variables
R_co=4.75*10^-3; %Radius to clad outer (m)
R_ci=4.18*10^-3; %Radius to clad inner (m)
R_po=R_co+P_t;
%Radius to poison outer (m)
Tcool=324;
%Temperature of coolant (C)
Tcl=1400;
%Fuel CL Temp (C)
rs_to_Tco=.151+.797+.190; %Thermal Resistance to Clad Outer
rs_pos_outer_to_mean=0.261; %Thermal Resistance from Poison Outer to Bulk
rs_Tco_to_pos_outer=log(R_po/R_co)/(2*pi*289); %Thermal Resistance from Clad Outer
%To Poison Outer
%Calculations
SumR=rs_to_Tco+rs_pos_outer_to_mean+rs_Tco_to_pos_outer;
Q=(Tcl-Tcool)/SumR;
TcladOuter=(Q*(.261+rs_Tco_to_pos_outer)+Tcool);
TCoAr(n)=TcladOuter;
ThicknessArray(n)=P_t;
n=n+1;
P_t=P_t+1*10^-4;
end
plot(ThicknessArray,TCoAr)
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